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ARISTOTLE ON SAMENESS AND ONENESS
I A M  H E R E going to advance a number of hypotheses about Aristotle’s treatment of identity (or, better, sameness, since 
we shall see that his word “ same” — ravrov— cannot by any means 
uniformly be translated by the word “ identical” ), both in the 
Topics and in other works. In general, though not always, I shall 
be contrasting the Topics with those other works, primarily the 
Physics and certain parts of the Metaphysics. I should emphasize 
at the start, though, that I shall not give much attention to the 
central books of the Metaphysics, such as IV  and V I  through 
IX , which I take to be late productions, and shall make only 
scattered use of Book X  (also late). I shall start by discussing some 
bits of the Topics which seem to me to show a relatively firm grasp 
of something like the notion of identity. I shall then start to show 
difficulties arising, particularly in other works, and signs that his 
grasp is weakening. I shall then try to explain why the weakening 
occurs, partly by means of some Platonic background. There will 
be quite a few loose ends and many points which could be argued 
in much greater detail. I have thought it useful, however, 
by treating together a number of features of Platonic and 
Aristotelian doctrine which are usually handled separately, 
to give a general picture on which refinements might later be 
made. One point deserves special mention. I generally assume 
that the Topics (including the Sophistici Elenchi— hereafter 
SE) are almost entirely early productions of Aristotle, earlier 
than almost all of the other works of his which I shall treat, and 
my language in this paper reflects a tendency to think of differences 
between the Topics and other works as signs of development in 
Aristotle’s thought. The argument of this paper, however, does 
not depend on this chronology since, as the reader will see, 
differences which might be tied to development can equally well 
be explained by the contrast between the concerns and issues 
raised in the several works. The point is important because the 
Categories, which I think may be even earlier than the Topics, 
shows affinity on the issues here treated with works other than it.
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Before I begin, let me get one substantial issue out of the way. 
Recently certain views which are in many ways similar to Aris­
totle’s have been expounded in connection with the idea that 
there is something wrong with the words “ same55 and “ identical55 
used by themselves, and that we should instead make use of 
expressions of the form “ same F ,55 where “ F 55 represents a general 
term.1 Aristotle, so far as I can find, never says any such thing, 
and although he does say a number of things which would seem 
to suggest, even perhaps to imply, such a view, and although he 
maintains that the word “ same55 carries many senses, he does 
not offer to resolve its ambiguity by coupling it with general terms. 
Indeed, he almost never uses “ same55 in this way,2 and only 
rarely thus uses his word for “ one,55 <=v.z I shall accordingly be 
doing without such couplings in what is to follow.
I
Any discussion of Aristotle5s treatment of the notifen of identity 
ought to begin with the Topics, because it is there that we get 
what are to most modern ears his plainest remarks on the subject. 
Look first at the first chapter of Book V II, where he is writing 
about that sense of “ same55 (ravrov) in which it means “ one in 
number55 (to rw apidnw lv\ 151629-30; cf. 10308, 23 ff.). At 152031­
32, he announces the principle that if A  is the same as B  but C  is 
not, then A  is not the same as C. In the next few lines (33-37), 
he tells us that if A  and B  are the same, then any accident of A  is 
an accident of B  and vice versa. This latter is a restricted version, 
dealing only with accidents, of what is nowadays often called 
Leibniz5 Law { L L ) f  which can here be loosely expressed by 
saying that if A  and B  are identical, then whatever is true of the
1 See, e.g., Peter Thomas Geach, Reference and Generality (Ithaca, 1962), esp. 
pp. 144 ff.; and David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford, 
1967). Geach and Wiggins do not, however, have the same reasons for holding 
this view (see Wiggins, pp. 1-2, 27).
2 I find an exception only at Met. 1016*232, and possibly another one at 
1016031 .
3 See 1016*231, £3-6, 1003626-28, and 1054017.
4 Whether correctly or not does not matter here.
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one is true of the other.5 At 133032-34 he had already given 
another restricted version, under which, if A  and B  are the same, 
then whatever is a “ property”  (proprium, tSiov) of the one is a 
“ property”  of the other. At 152625-29, however, he widens the 
principle so as to take in any predicate at all, not just accidents or 
properties.
In precipitously giving his unrestricted version of L L , Aristotle 
fails to take precautions against contexts in which, as Quine puts 
it, extensionality fails,6 and runs the risk of encountering para­
doxes. This he does, not in the Topics proper, but in the Sophistici 
Elenchi, c. 24. At 17961-4, he deals with the difficulty that one 
might know and not know the same thing; for example, it might 
be the case that I know Coriscus, that I do not know the hooded 
man over there, and yet that the hooded man over there is 
Coriscus.7
As Aristotle sees it, the problem is that one and the same thing 
would seem both to have and to lack the attribute of being known 
by me. For this reason, he gives in and puts a new sort of restriction 
on L L . He retreats from saying without qualification that if A  and 
B  are the same, then whatever is true of the one is true of the 
other. Rather, he maintains (to use his manner of putting it) that 
the same things belong only to things which are without difference 
and one in substance ( rots* K a ra  rrjv  ovaiav  dSia(popois K al ev o v a iv ). This 
contention clearly retracts some of what has been said at 152625­
29, 152033-37 (and an apparent application of the former at 
133631 if.)* The new restriction has in fact already been adum­
brated at 166631-32 and 16963-6, and we find it again in his 
writings at Physics 212614-16,8 where he says, “ It is not the case 
that all the same things belong to things which are the same in
5 As I am here using the label, what is being called “Leibniz’ Law” is not to 
be confused with its converse, sometimes called the “ Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles,” or with the biconditional equivalent to the conjunction of the 
two.
6 See W.V. Quine, Word and Object (New York, i 960), p. 15 1 , and secs. 30 ff.
7 Aristotle classes this puzzle together with some others which seem quite 
dissimilar. I shall not comment on them here, except to note that a like confla­
tion occurs at De Interpretatione 1 1 , esp. 20^35-36 .
8 This for anyone who has doubts about the authenticity of the SE, in whole 
or in part.
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just any old way, but only to those things whose being ( t o  zlvai) is 
the same.” 9
Here he is worried, not about failure of substitutivity of identity 
like the one in the S E , but about the problem concerning the 
road from Athens to Thebes and the road from Thebes to Athens: 
they are in a way the same, he believes, but one is uphill and the 
other is downhill (cf. 202018-20). Nevertheless, the restriction 
which he places on L L  is clearly the same as that of the 
S E .1Q
In spite of the difference between the puzzles raised respectively 
in the S E  and the Physics, one might hope that at least the former 
would show Aristotle working in a quite up-to-date way on 
probems arising from the enclosing of sentences in so-called 
opaque contexts (cf. Quine, loc. cit.). For one might be tempted 
to say that the problem about Coriscus and the hooded man is 
generated by the fact that even if I know that Coriscus is Coriscus, 
and it is the case that the hooded man is Coriscus, it does not 
follow that I know that the hooded man is Coriscus.11
Nevertheless, this is not the way in which Aristotle puts the 
matter. He here uses “ Coriscus”  and “ the hooded man” only as 
(grammatically) direct objects of the verb “ to know”  and does 
not follow it by expressions of sentential form. In 179^27-33, 
where he summarizes an alternative approach to the puzzle 
(introduced at 179^7), we might at first think that we are being 
shown sentences within a “ knows that”  context, but more likely 
Aristotle is using the Greek construction which is to be rendered 
word by word into English by the form .. knows X , that it is Y ”  
He never explicitly contrasts this sort of construction with one 
in which a full sentence appears in a “ knows that”  context, and 
there is no reason to believe that he saw this distinction with any
9 The Loeb translation of Wicksteed and Cornford renders this sentence 
incorrectly; the Oxford version, by H ardie and Gaye, is only a little off the 
mark.
10 There is no need here to go into the problem allegedly raised by the 
Athens-Thebes road, or the issue in connection with which Aristotle raises it in 
the Physics.
11 This is not to say that this temptation is correct, or that this is the way 
in which we ought to explain such locutions as “knows Coriscus.’’ I leave this 
matter aside.
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clarity.12 A  byproduct of this neglect is that he would be crippled 
in any attempt to make a distinction between what Russell once 
called “ primary”  and “ secondary”  occurrences of singular 
terms.13 Likewise, it is just about impossible for him to say anything 
extensive about problems of substitutivity of identity in modal or 
other opaque contexts, simply because he is unlikely to be able to 
express clearly just what the relevant contexts are in particular 
cases and what falls within them. Moreover, since he rejects the 
solution of 17967-33, in which we get our only explicit hint of 
whole sentences in opaque contexts, we should expect to find him 
saying relatively little about them. The expectation is confirmed 
by other parts of the Topics and by other works as well.14
Some doubt that L L  is true. I shall not argue the question, but 
it seems obvious to me that it is true, and that anyone who wants 
to deny it had better come up with a clear alternative account of 
how he is using the word “ identical.” 15
I am going to begin from this standpoint and ask what notion 
of sameness Aristotle can have in mind if it is not backed up by 
ZZ, and whether it can be anything like the notion of identity as 
so backed up. Now the problem is not merely that Aristotle offers 
us uses of “ same”  for which he says that L L  does not hold. It is 
also, first, that although L L  is allowed to hold for sameness in 
substance or being, Aristotle betrays in the passages we have seen 
no belief that this law is central to the explanation of even this 
sort of sameness. So far as I can discover, the passages which I 
have mentioned are the only ones in which any version of the 
law appears in his works. Moreover, it notably fails to figure in 
other places where he announces a treatment of the word “ same,”  
such as Metaphysics V,9 and various passages of Metaphysics X .
12 For some background on a related m atter see, e.g., Montgomery Furth, 
“Elements of Eleatic Ontology,” Journal o f the History o f Philosophy, V I (1968), 
1 1 3 -1 1 4 .
13 See “O n Denoting,” Mind, 14 (1905), 489 ff., or Logic and Knowledge, ed. by 
Robert C. Marsh (London, 1956), pp. 52 ff.
14 I t is to be noted in passing that the alternative solution of 17967-33 is 
rejected not because it is straightforwardly wrong, but because it is held not to 
be applicable to other problems which Aristotle thinks (though we generally 
would not; cf. n. 7) are to be classed with this one.
15 In  this vein see Wiggins, op. cit., pp. 5 , 16 ff.
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It fails to appear, furthermore, outside of the Topics and the SE, 
except for the one passage from the Physics which I have cited. 
This distribution of allusions to L L  raises another question: why 
does Aristotle in other works, in particular the Metaphysics, lose 
the at least mild interest which L L  held for him in the Topics? 
We now have enough to motivate us to try to investigate Aristotle’s 
account of the word “ same.”
II
First, though, I shall try to raise some other suspicions, which 
will be useful later, concerning Aristotle’s grasp of identity as it 
figures in Leibniz’ Law. In his treatment of “ same” in Topics I, 7, 
he contends that it has three main uses: “ same in number,”  “ same 
in species,”  and “ same in genus.”  Now even though he represents 
these three senses as being all on a par, it is clear that the latter 
two are importantly different from the first, in that they seem to 
represent kinds of (broadly speaking) similarity,16 whereas the 
first does not. In these two senses, if A  and B  are “ the same,”  then 
they may be non-identical.17
What makes them the same in species or genus is simply that 
they fall under the same species or genus— that is (roughly), they 
share an attribute which attaches to them in a certain way. Even 
if we suppose for the moment that Aristotle’s “ same in number”  
(here divided into three subsenses; elsewhere “ same in number”  
gets a quite different treatment) represents something like 
identity, it is noteworthy that Aristotle does not mark it off 
from “ same in species”  and “ same in genus” as being of a quite 
different type. The fact that he does not so mark it off might lead 
one to suspect that he does not have plainly in view a distinction 
between similarity and identity.
16 I use “ similarity” here where someone might prefer “similarity in some 
respect or other.” I say this with my eye on those who might claim that one 
kind of similarity is not to be distinguished from identity—namely, similarity 
in all respects. Note that to make this claim is to say more than one who simply 
asserts LL, in my use of that label.
17 I t  is even suggested at 103010 (ttXclo) ovtcl) that they must be non-identical 
(cf. also 152632). The motivation for this view might be that it seems somehow 
pointless to say, e.g., that Socrates is the same in species or genus as himself. 
A different line is taken by Aristotle at Met. 1016^35-36 .
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O f course, Aristotle does have a word, opoiov, which is usually 
translated “ similar.”  He uses ofjLoiorrjs here in his explanation of 
“ same in species”  when he says (103(219-23), “ all water is said to 
be the same as all other water because of bearing a certain 
similarity; and the only difference in the case of water from the 
same spring is that the similarity is stronger,”  and he uses this 
claim to support the view that sameness of two samples of water 
from one spring really is a case of specific sameness. Elsewhere, 
however, he takes greater pains to distinguish ofjLoiorrjs and ravrorrj^. 
In Metaphysics V,9, the former gets separate, though cursory, 
treatment (1018(215-19), as it does also at Metaphysics X , 1054&3­
14,18 and the idea which is emphasized is that A  and B  are properly 
said to be “ similar”  by virtue of their sharing accidental attributes 
or 7rd07/, not by sharing substance attributes.19 We would, I think, 
prefer to contrast more emphatically than Aristotle does the 
relation between A  and B  which consists in their sharing some 
attribute or attributes, of whatever kind, and identity. The contrast 
which we have so far seen highlighted is one between (as I am 
putting it) different kinds of similarity or resemblance, depending 
on the way in which the shared attributes attach to their 
subjects.
It may look as though we should say that Aristotle has not 
clearly distinguished between resemblance and identity, but this 
would be somewhat unfair. The notion which he expresses in the 
Topics by “ same in number”  is surely something like identity, and 
the same appears to be true at Metaphysics X ,3, 1054(234-35. 
Still it cannot be identity of the sort which figures in the restricted 
L L  of S E  24; for one of the kinds of numerical sameness which he 
allows is accidental sameness (Top. 103*229 ff.), which is not 
sameness in being or in substance, and hence is not covered by 
that law. Furthermore, he is quite happy explicitly to count as 
distinct in definition (Aoyos) or in being (Jrai) things which are
18 In  the latter, however, o/jlolov is said to apply in one of its uses to things 
which, while not the same in their “ compound substance” (there is no need 
here to go into the meaning of this phrase), are the same in species.
19 Met. 1018015- 19, 105439- 14, 1O2 10 11- 1 2 ; cf. for background Plato, 
Parmenides 1390 and 140a-b. Note too Cat. 1 la  15- 19, where oftotor^s is restricted 
to things sharing attributes in the category of quality.
accidentally the same (e.g., Phys. 190014-17, 262021, 263613-14; 
De Gen. *£ Corr. 320613 fF.; De An. 42703-5).
I shall now try to give an account, which will necessarily be 
somewhat roundabout, of Aristotle’s use of the word “ same.”  
We have seen that his grip on the Leibniz-like notion of identity 
was already somewhat weak in the Topics, but I shall now try to 
show how and why his attention there to L L  and restrictions of 
it flags in other works. This project will require a discussion of his 
notion of oneness, its connection with his notion of sameness, and 
of Plato’s treatment of these matters.
I l l
Aside from its use, however cursory, of L L  and similar principles, 
the Topics is unusual among Aristotle’s works in giving any prom­
inence at all to the notion of sameness and the expression “ same.”  
Topics 1 ,7  is officially about it, as are V II, 1-2 and a stretch of V , 4 
(esp. 133615 ff.). In other works, however, the word “ one”  receives 
greater attention, and “ same”  gets dragged in by the way, as in 
Metaphysics V ,6 and 9, and X. Still, both in the Topics and in other 
works, there is a strong tendency to explain (though not officially 
to define in Aristotle’s technical sense) the word “ same”  in its 
various uses in terms of the word “ one”  in its. See, for example, 
in the Topics 10309-10, 2 4 ,3 1 , 151630, 152011, 27, 179038; in 
Metaphysics X , such places as 1054034, 61, 22; and in Metaphysics 
V , 101804-7, and the straightforward claim of 101807-8 that 
“ sameness is a kind of oneness”  (the rest of what he says here will 
be discussed later). We are going to have to take a look, therefore, 
at what Aristotle has to say about the word “ one.”  This enterprise 
takes us away from the Topics, where— as far as I can find— there 
is no extended passage devoted to the word, and into other works.
Let us start with Metaphysics V,6. Aristotle does not mark the 
contrast, but it is initially tempting to say that among the uses 
of “ one”  which he sets forth, we can distinguish between a one- 
place use and a two-(or more-) place use. That is, we may either 
say something of the form “ X and Y  (and etc.) are one”  or “ Xis 
one with F ”  (where the word represented by ^is in the dative case), 
or else something of the form “ X  is one.”  What Aristotle calls the
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“ accidental”  sense of “ one”  at first appears to be of the former 
type, as do the types given at 1016017-24 (one in having a substra­
tum undifferentiated in form [eidos]; ra> to vttok€L}1€vov to> eiSei 
that aSiacpopov), 24-32 (being of the same genus but having 
opposed differentiae; 3>v to yeVos* tv 8tacpipov Tals avTiKeinivais 
SiacpopaLS), 3261 (one in Xoyos— e.g., to rfv^jievov and TO cpdlvov). 
The latter type is exemplified in most of 1015634-1016017, on 
various kinds of oneness by continuity. The word “ same,”  on the 
other hand, has no one-place use, and although in c. 9 Aristotle 
says that it has as many per se uses as “ one”  (101805— there seems 
no reasonable alternative to Jaeger’s conjecture “ otfax<oc77r€p” ), he 
gives us no one-place use of the word corresponding to “ one by 
continuity”  in c. 6. It appears that Aristotle may be having 
trouble linking up “ same”  and “ one”  in the way he wants 
to.
I said that Aristotle does not in c. 6 explicitly recognize the 
distinction between one- and many-place uses of the word “ one,”  
and when we look more closely we see that it is not very sharp at 
all in his examples. For one thing, the accidental use of “ one”  
does not uniformly provide us with obvious two-place uses, 
since at 1015618 we are allowed to say that musical Coriscus is 
(accidentally) one, which is claimed to be the same as saying that 
Coriscus and the musical are one. (Aristotle is not here talking 
about the case where we say that musical Coriscus is one with 
Coriscus or with the musical; this sort of case is taken up further 
on, in 11. 23 ff.) Nor do we consistently get two-place uses out of 
the sense “ one in having a substratum undifferentiated in form”  
(1016017-24): here we are allowed to say that wine is one, as well 
as that all liquids, such as wine and oil, are one. Our initial attempt 
to find this syntactic distinction begins to falter. Keep in mind 
that “ same” is still resolutely two-placed.
I am now going to try to explain why Aristotle does not draw 
a contrast between one- and two-place uses of “ one,”  and to 
show how my explanation affects the prospects for finding him 
using the word to express identity. I shall then try to show how 
his use of the word “ same”  to express the same notion is affected 
by his treatment of “ one.”  Afterward, I shall return to his use of 
Leibniz’ Law and related principles in the Topics, and say
something about the Platonic background of his treatment of 
oneness and sameness.
Notice first the way in which the accidental sense of “ one55 is 
set forth in Metaphysics V,6, 1015616-34. As I have said, Aristotle 
allows us to say things of the form “ X  is one with Y ”  where the 
word in place of Y  stands in the dative case (1015624, 26-27), 
and we seem to have some kind of sameness here (perhaps the 
same object under different descriptions or the like— it does not 
matter much). But there are also sentences of the form “ X  and Y  
are one55 (e.g., 17-18, 19-20), and it is upon these that I want to 
focus, since my hypothesis is that Aristotle is led into serious 
difficulties largely, though not exclusively, by an ambiguity 
of such sentences. One may take “ X  and Y  are one55 either to 
mean that X  is somehow identical with Y, that they are the same 
thing of a sort, or else to mean that they together make up one thing 
(of a sort) which has them as its constituents.20 It is a common­
place that Greek philosophers were prone to say that a white 
musical man, say, can be somehow logically divided up into three 
parts, the white part, the musical part, and the man part,21 and 
Aristotle himself is willing to put the matter in just this way in 
various places. See, for example, De Interpretatione 11, 20617-19; 
Topics 1336 17-19 ,31 -33; and Physics 1,7,190020-21 (to e| dficpotv— sc. 
ro v  afiovoov  andtov avdpcbirov— ovyKelfJievov,o lov  o afiovoosavdpo jiros), 
620-22 (avyK eira i y a p  o iiovariKos avdpojiros dvdpcoirov Kal ttovg ikov  
Tpoirov riva. SiaXvaeis yap els tovs Xoyovs rovs €K€lvcov). (See also the 
use of“ aw/Berov”  and “ irpoodtois”  in Met. V II ,4, though I think that 
the ideas of Met. V II  differ importantly from those of the works 
which I am primarily discussing.) Moreover, the same idea comes 
through in Metaphysics V,6, where we are told that, for example, 
the musical and Coriscus are one because the former is an accident 
of the latter, or the musical and the just are one because they are 
both accidents of the same thing, Coriscus. Their being one
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20 One might see a similar ambiguity, for that matter, in English sentences 
of the form “X  and T  constitute a single thing,” since one might say either that 
the left and right halves of the Eiffel Tower constitute a single thing (tower), 
or that Cicero and Tully constitute a single thing (man)—at least I think that 
this latter way of talking is acceptable in ordinary English.
21 See the remarks of Furth, op. cit., p. 124 .
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consists in their being in some way (by the connection, accidentally 
belonging) bound together. Furthermore, as 1015^18-19 takes 
pains to assert, we can speak not only of X  and Y ’s being one; we 
can in this casealso speak of X T 's  being one (ravToyapelireZvKoplGKos 
Kal to novaiKov Kal KopicTKos fjLovcriKos), and its being one (acciden­
tally) consists in its parts being bound together in a certain way. The 
same is true of the apparently quite different (per se) sort of oneness 
which Aristotle takes up next, oneness by continuity: a thing is 
one in this sense by having its spatial or material parts bound 
together in one of a number of ways (e.g., by glue). On the other 
hand it is clear that in saying that X  and T  are one, Aristotle does 
not simply mean that they are parts of the same compound entity; 
he also means to say that they are in some sense the same, as each 
other. For in writing of accidental sameness in Metaphysics V,g, 
1017^27-101804, he gives exactly the same explanation o f66X  and
Y  are accidentally the same”  (or “ X  is accidentally the same as 
Y ” — “ as Y ”  again representing a dative) which he gave in c. 6 
for “ X  and Y  are accidentally one.” 22
There are some signs, then, that Aristotle is not keeping 
separate the use of “ X  and Y  are one”  to mean that they are in 
some way identical from its use to say that they make up a unitary 
entity. The test of this claim, however, is in how much it can 
explain, so I want to try to put it to work. In the first place, 
it explains why he does not explicitly distinguish the one-place and 
two-place uses of “ one” : there are cases where one- and two- 
place uses seem interchangeable. (On the other hand, however, 
one might well prefer to use the existence of this sort of case to 
explain the confusion which I am hypothesizing.) It can also be 
used to account for his curious statement at 101807-9: “ so it is 
clear that sameness is a kind of oneness either of the being of 
several things or (of one thing) when it is treated as several, as 
when one says that a thing is the same as itself; for one treats it as 
two”  (c5ot€ cpavepov on rj tclvtottjs evorrjs rls icrnv 77 TrXecovcov rod elvai 
77 orav xpfji’ai d)S irXelooiv, otov orav Xeyrj avro avrqj ravrov. <hs Svcrl yap 
Xprjrai avrcp). To say that Xis the same as X  is just to say that X  is
22 See also the combination a t De Gen. et Con. 320613ff. ( . . .  vkqv. . .  rqv avrrjv 
Kal fitav apidfjLcp, rev Aoyq> Be fxrj filav), and Cat. 4<2io-i 1.1 would not, however, want 
to put a great deal of the weight of the argument on such passages.
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one with X ;  but this is to say that X  and X  (together) constitute 
one thing, and this in turn is to treat X  as two things going to 
make up one thing. There is of course no one-place use of “ same,55 
or anything else at hand to force on Aristotle the realization that 
the word may be used in sentences in which only a single thing 
is referred to. In a similar vein Aristotle in De Interpretatione n  
objects to (among others) expressions of the form “ X X ,55 “ X X X ”  
and so on (whether they be in subject or predicate position; 
20631-2104), treating them as objectionable on the same score 
as “ musical white walking,55 which on the view of the De Inter­
pretatione (which does not here make allowance for things which 
are accidentally one), designates nothing unitary.23
If these remarks about the state of Aristotle5s thinking in 
Metaphysics V  are correct, they go some way toward showing why 
he is neglecting to give a clear account ot the notion of identity. 
Rather than thinking about what it is for X  and T  to be identical, 
he has his mind fixed on what it is for an entity to be unitary, 
whether its having elements is compatible with its being unitary, 
what sort of elements they must be, and how they must be joined 
together. This discussion drags the treatment of sameness along 
on its coattails. In the Topics, it was different. There Aristotle was 
relatively unconcerned with the notion of oneness and concen­
trated his attention instead on sameness. As a result he was able to 
come up with some fairly straightforward things to say, including 
his tentative moves toward Leibniz5 Law. It is important that 
in the Topics he is relatively (though not, of course, completely) 
unconcerned with a host of metaphysical problems, particularly 
about change, which arise out of Plato5s Theory of Forms, and is 
working out his own lines of thought (cf. Topics 100018-21; S E  34,
23 Notice that Aristotle may be violating a stricture of Top. 150020-21 
(against identifying a part of a thing with the whole) when in Met. V, 9 he 
allows the musical man, which is a compound of the musical and the man, to be 
accidentally the same as the musical and as the man.
I t  should be remarked, by the way, that Aristotle’s use of “ X  and T are one,” 
“ X  is one with T ,” and “X T  is one” may have a parallel in his use of the verb 
“to be” ; see G.E.L. Owen, “Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology,” in Renford 
Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (New York and London, 
I9^5 )J pp. 69-96 ; and Anscombe in G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Three 
Philosophers (Oxford, 1963), pp. 22-23 . There is a good deal to be said on this 
matter, however, and I shall not attem pt to attack it here.
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esp. 183634-36, 18461-8). I now want to suggest how preoccupa­
tion with certain Platonic difficulties might have deflected 
Aristotle from working out the notion of identity more thoroughly 
and straightforwardly in works other than the Topics.
IV
Now to the classical Theory of Forms of Plato’s period, in 
connection with which I shall here deal primarily with problems of 
identity of objects over time. We wonder what makes (so to speak) 
the table we saw yesterday identical with the table we see today. 
I think that it is fairly clear that neither Plato nor Aristotle had 
any clear notion of time slices, temporal parts of things, or the 
like (in spite of the analogies drawn in Physics IV , 10-14 between 
motion and time). Still, they dealt with problems which can 
fruitfully be discussed in these terms. G.E.L. Owen has argued 
that on the classical Theory of Forms, Plato held that Forms have 
no temporal careers, because there is nothing true of a Form at 
one time which is not true of it at every other time.24
In the Sophist, however, Plato decided that coming to be known, 
for example, is a change (in a broad sense) which a Form under­
goes, and so his old view had to be given up. With it, Plato had 
to give up the contention of the Timaeus (37^-38a) that we cannot 
use “ was”  or “ will be”  of the Forms, but only of changing 
sensible objects. I take it th&t this temporal careerlessness was 
part of what Plato meant earlier when he said that each Form 
is one. On the classical theory, the Forms “ are,”  while sensible 
objects are “ between being and not-being.” 25 But Plato also 
draws the contrast between being and becoming, and assigns the 
Forms to the first and sensible objects to the second. This much is 
common knowledge. He never, though, says very forthrightly 
what he means by suggesting that the world of sensible objects is 
a world of becoming. In the Theaetetus (181-183) he pillories a
24 “ Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present/’ Monist, 50 (1966), 
3 17 -340, where Owen also argues that Plato was here taking a cue from 
Parmenides’ views about “ the O ne.”
25 On Plato’s grounds for this claim I agree in large part with what Vlastos 
has to say in Bambrough (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1-20.
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theory under which sensible objects are claimed to be constantly 
changing in every respect: it may be that he is attacking his old 
theory here, but it is very hard to find a clear statement of such 
an extreme view in his earlier works.26
When he said that sensible objects “ become,”  what I think 
Plato meant can be put something like this.27
Sensible objects have continuous careers in time: for any two 
different points in the career of such a thing, there is a point in 
between them. This is assured by the fact that every sensible 
object is continuously changing— not, indeed, in every respect, 
but in some respect or other. This is represented by Plato’s notion 
of “ growing older,”  on which see Timaeus 38a (cf. Parm. 141 a-d, 
152a-e) and Owen (op. cit., pp. 335-336). But a consequence which 
Plato is willing to draw from this claim of constant change in 
sensible objects is that there is something problematic about 
saying that such objects retain their identity over time. His point 
is that, given an object which, viewed in the ordinary way, has 
a certain career in time with particular boundary points (such as 
Socrates), one can see on reflection that there is no reason in 
principle why it must be said to begin or leave off at any particular 
time rather than another. We count Socrates as the same over a 
period, but we could just as well cut the world differently, along 
its temporal axis, and provide ourselves with a series of Socrates
26 We are here in the middle of a controversial topic: see Owen, “The Place 
of the Timaeus in Plato’s Dialogues,” in R.E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato's Meta­
physics (London and New York, 1965), p. 3 2 3 ; and H. Cherniss, “The Relation 
of the Timaeus to Plato’s Later Dialogues,” ibid., pp. 349-360. 1 think that Owen 
is right in this matter, and I shall not attem pt to join in the debate here.
27 I am not going to argue here as fuUy for this claim as one might. My main 
support for this interpretation is not any explicit statement of Plato’s, but 
rather the fact that if we accept it, we get a clearer picture than we would 
otherwise have of the motivation for Aristotle’s views. Since my prim ary 
Platonic evidence for the interpretation comes from relatively late dialogues 
(such as the Parmenides and the Theaetetus, in which I take Plato to be re­
examining and revising his classical Theory of Forms of the Republic and the 
Phaedo), I would be willing to entertain seriously the following view: the inter­
pretation of the classical theory which I offer is not one which can unequivocally 
be fastened on Plato’s classical theory, but rather represents Plato’s attempts in 
his later works to explain more clearly and precisely what he had been trying 
to get at in his earlier rather impressionistic talk of becoming in the sensible 
world.
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stages down to the smallest thickness we like. There is nothing 
sacrosanct about the boundaries which we do draw, since the 
objects are constantly changing in some way or other. Preoccu­
pation with the idea that any kind of change can be taken as 
tantamount to perishing comes out in several passages of the 
Parmenides (e.g., 1550- 1560, 1630-6, 01-2, 14604-rfi with 14507­
14608, 13801-3 ), and at Theaetetus 1580-1590 (especially 15966-10), 
which I do not have space to explicate in detail here, but which 
I think contains in part a development of earlier beliefs of Plato’s 
own (cf. n.27). We can make this idea sit well with certain 
characteristically Platonic ways of talking. He need not be (and 
probably is not) saying that sensible objects just do not retain 
their identity over time at all, so that, say, the Socrates we see in
401 B.C. flatly is not identical with the Socrates at the trial in 
399. Rather, in some ways he is identical and in other ways he is 
not. Otherwise put, he has changed in some respects but not in 
others, and this is enough for us to say that he is qualifiedly (but 
only qualifiedly) identical over this period.28 The notion of qual­
ified identity comes clearly at Theaetetus 158-159, especially at 
15807-8, 9-IO (“erepov TTavraTracnv” t(rfj jxkv erepov, rfj Si r a v ro v ” 
“ oXcos Zrepov” ; cf. Parm. 14608-dfi).
V
What is Aristotle’s answer to all of this?29 It is not fully 
elaborated in the works of the Organon, but it must come to
28 For parallels to this line of thought see Owen, “A Proof in the Peri Ideon ,” 
Allen (ed.), op. cit., pp. 298-3 12 . It is worth noting—though the development of 
this point would require a long story—that in the section of the Theaetetus 
devoted to false belief ( 187-200), Plato deals with identity claims about 
spatiotemporal objects in a manner which bears marked similarity to Aristotle’s 
treatment. See J.L. Ackrill, “Plato on False Belief: Theaetetus 187-200,” Monist, 
50, 3 (July, 1966), 383-402. Among the points made by Ackrill which are 
relevant to my discussion, two stand out. First, Plato does not succeed in working 
out the idea that the very same thing may be referred to by two different 
expressions. Second, although Plato vindicates the possibility of certain false 
beliefs about spatio temporal objects, he does it by avoiding straightforward 
identity statements in favor of statements of a different sort. As Ackrill puts it 
(p. 401), “. . . believing that the man I see is the man I saw yesterday is [as 
Plato views it] believing that this item of experience belongs to one and the same 
continuant as that item of experience.”
29 It is here that we begin to see the advantage claimed in note 27 for my
something like this. For Socrates to remain a man over a stretch 
of time is for him to remain the same in a particularly important 
way, more important than the way in which he remains the same 
if he continues to be musical or just. For him to stop being a man 
is for him to change in a more important way than he would if 
he stopped being musical or just. We can see the idea in Categories 
4010 ff. where he argues for the view that “What seems to be most 
distinctive of substance is to be able, while remaining one and the 
same in number (ravrov Kal ev apidnw ), to receive contraries.” 
Notice that here the weight of explaining the identity of Socrates 
over time is put upon his having at a later time the same important 
attribute which he had at an earlier time. It is, if you like, a kind 
of similarity between him and himself in respect of substance 
attribute, a similarity which fails to hold with respect to every 
attribute since there are ways in which he changes. This is, I 
think, only part of the story, but it is enough to enable us to see 
how the notion of identity as it figures in Leibniz’ Law could come 
to have relatively little hold on Aristotle’s mind. For if we take up 
this preoccupation in this way, we can say that Socrates remains 
the same over time and yet deny that just the same attributes are 
true of him which used to be. For example, yesterday it was true 
to say of him that he is in the market place, but today it is not. Or, 
it is now both true and false of him that he was in the market 
place, since sometimes he was and sometimes he was not. Of 
course we could cut through this difficulty by making verbs 
tenseless and including designations of times in our predicates, 
but as Hintikka has frequently pointed out, Aristotle never seems 
to take advantage of this device.30
Now obviously something has sneaked in the side door. What 
is claimed to make Socrates the same over time is that he is a man 
throughout the period. But being a man is common not only to 
Socrates early and late; it is also common to Socrates, Plato, 
Adeimantus, and so on. We do not yet have enough to distinguish
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account of Platonic “becoming,” which allows us to throw into sharper relief 
than is sometimes done the departure from Plato’s views inherent in 
Aristotle’s contrast between substantial and accidental predication.
30 For example, in “The Once and Future Sea Fight,” Philosophical Review, 
LXXIII ( 1964), 461-492.
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them, if this is all we have for identity and non-identity. Of course, 
Aristotle wants to say from the beginning that they are different 
in number, and in later works he falls back on the notion of matter 
to explain this difference.31 Here we are at the beginning of a very 
long story, which I shall not try to tell now. Suffice it to say that 
there is other evidence for believing that Aristotle is squarely faced 
with this difficulty, particularly in Metaphysics VII.32
One point can be briefly taken up in passing. The problem of 
identity over time must concern Aristotle not only for individual 
sensible objects, but also for universals. In the Sophist, Plato had 
given grounds for saying that Forms change, and Aristotle has to 
deal with this issue. He can be seen working on it in Metaphysics 
V II,7-9, and especially clearly at Physics 211021-23  (where he 
says that whiteness and knowledge can undergo locomotion 
accidentally, because what they are “in” does so; cf. also 2466 
14- 15 , 24706-7, and probably 22806- 19). What keeps universals 
the same, so to speak, is that their definitions stay fixed.
VI
I have used this discussion of identity over time to suggest a 
reason why Aristotle did not put stock in Leibniz’ Law in works 
other than the Topics, and a reason why he does not draw as clear 
a contrast as he might have between identity and similarity in a 
certain respect. As for the latter, the point is that the particular 
worries to which Platonic considerations led him have prompted 
him to treat a (for him) central sort of identity as simply a special 
case of similarity in a certain special respect. As for the former, 
the point is that when he operates in the manner which I have 
described, LL  simply seems to fail for particular primary sub­
stances. Now let me link up these points with the claim which I 
made earlier, that Aristotle seems to be unclear about two uses of 
“ X  and Y  are one” (and hence “ X  and Y  are the same”), the 
one expressing an identity statement and the other asserting that 
X  and Y  go together to make up a unitary thing.
31 E.g., at Met. 103405-8 ; cf. Anscombe, “The Principle of Individuation,** 
Proceedings c f  the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 27 ( 1953), 83-96.
32 See Owen, “The Platonism of Aristotle,** Proceedings o f the British Academy, 
LI ( 1965), 136- 137 .
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I can wonder about whether the eyeglasses I put on today are 
identical with the ones I put on yesterday, and I can wonder what 
(so to speak) makes them so if they are so. But I can also wonder 
whether today’s and yesterday’s eyelasses go together to make up 
a single thing or, say, whether my eating of a part of a sandwich 
between 3:00 and 3:04 and my finishing that sandwich between 
3 :15  and 3:17  go to make up a single bout of sandwich-eating. 
This latter sort of case is discussed by Aristotle in Physics V,4, and 
figures in his attempts to distinguish between Kwrjcns and evdpyeca.33 
The former type of case is also on his mind. Plainly he is not 
primarily worried about the possibility that someone stole my 
old pair of glasses, took them away somewhere (where they now 
reside), and substituted another pair. Rather he wonders, given 
that no such thing occurred, what makes the pairs of glasses “the 
same.” This can be represented as a worry about the right 
temporal boundaries to draw in the world. See, for example, 
Physics, IV, 1 1 , especially 219619-23 , where Aristotle allows a way 
in which Coriscus in the Lyceum is different (erepov) from Coriscus 
in the market place (this apropos of the problem of the unity of 
“the now”). More relevant to my present concern, however, is 
what Aristotle has to say about continuity in Metaphysics V,6, 
101605-6, along with 1052019-61 from Metaphysics X ,i. In both 
of these places a thing is said to be one by continuity, by virtue 
of having “one motion” (/u'a klvtjgis), which must mean “a motion 
which is one or unitary,” since Aristotle says that what moves 
with circular locomotion “is in the primary sense one extended 
thing” (thus Ross: “to£to 7rptorov fxeyedos eV” ) .  As before, Aristotle is 
not very clear about the distinction between saying that motion X  
and motion T  are identical and saying that they are parts of a 
single motion, and the same problem crops up in Physics V,4- But 
notice that in 1052022 ff. (esp. 25-26), he maintains that for a 
thing to be a whole (oXov) and have a shape and form (tiopyrj kclI 
eiSos*), it should have one motion, indivisible in place and time. 
He is claiming a connection between a thing’s having a form and 
its having a career which is in some sense unitary, which cannot 
be divided up into any natural parts. The presence of this idea is
83 See the following section, and AckrilPs paper in Bambrough (ed.), op. cit., 
pp. 121-142.
not surprising, since Aristotle is often ready to think of the form 
of a thing, especially a living thing, as its characteristic way of 
behaving, of going on, in time, and not just its “shape” at a given 
instant. Socrates’ being one over time consists in his continuously 
going on in an intelligibly uniform way, and today’s Socrates 
being one with (or, the same as) yesterday’s consists in there being 
no natural point of division in the interim, nothing to keep the two 
from going together to make up something one.
VII
The difference, when talking of spatiotemporal objects, 
between saying that X  is identical with T  and saying that X  and T  
go together to make up (or as parts of) a single thing, is to be 
linked up with another issue. If, pointing toward a table at two 
different moments, I say, “That (pointing once) is identical with 
that (pointing again),” then we would usually want to say, if we 
are taking words at face value, that the references of the two 
occurrences of “that” were one and the same, the temporally 
continuing table. If, on the other hand, we say, rather, “That 
(pointing once) goes together with that (pointing again) to make 
up one thing (table),” then it is most natural to view each 
occurrence of “that” as referring to a different time slice of the 
table. The case is clear enough when we have demonstratives.34 
It is clear, too, that in analogous cases we might be required 
similarly to adjust our construal of singular terms other than 
demonstratives. “Socrates” might thus be used to stand either for 
the full temporal extent of the man or to some stage or other of 
him. (This is a somewhat loose manner of speaking, but the 
looseness is irrelevant to present purposes.)
The point just dealt with, however, is one which Aristotle does 
not discuss. The reason is no doubt that he does not, as I have 
said, have the notion of four-dimensional spatiotemporal objects.
34 There is an obvious parallel for space: in the first case think of the reference 
of both occurrences of “that” as being the whole spatial extent of the table 
(with time ignored); in the latter, think of each occurrence as referring to a 
different spatial portion of it. I am deliberately avoiding consideration of 
Quine’s notion of the inscrutability of reference (see, e.g., his Word and Object, 
ch. II, and “Ontological Relativity,” Journal o f Philosophy, 65 [ 1968], 185-212 ).
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He does, I think, make his point sufficiently clear without it, and 
nothing which I have said seems to me to depend on the sup­
position that he has it.
In conclusion, I want to point out the relationship between the 
issues canvassed above and another point of Aristotelian scholar­
ship, and to indicate a further line of investigation. In various 
places, Aristotle tries to draw a distinction between energeiai (one 
of his favorite examples is seeing) and kineseis (e.g., building a 
temple). In his discussion of this distinction (see n.33 ), J.L. 
Ackrill has argued, against Ryle,35 that4‘it is no part of Aristotle’s 
view of energeiai that they cannot go on through time” (p. 126). 
Ryle had maintained, on the contrary, that Aristotle’s energeia- 
words, as opposed to kinesis-words, “do not stand for anything 
that goes on, i.e. has a beginning, a middle and an end” (p. 106).
I want to suggest that Aristotle has temptations in both directions. 
On Ackrill’s side, the evidence which he marshals speaks for 
itself. On the other hand, it does seem to be part of Aristotle’s view 
that, as Ackrill says (pp. 127- 128), “there is no upper or lower 
limit to the time [the energeia] may occupy, and. . . it is somehow 
equally and fully present throughout any such period.” J.O. 
Urmson has suggested that Aristotle’s point is that an energeia 
can be viewed as unchanging throughout its duration, in the 
sense that if we pick the right class of attributes, we shall find that 
an energeia does not change from having any one of these attri­
butes to not having it, or vice versa; a kinesis, on the other hand, 
does change in these relevant respects.36 Thus, an energeia can in 
one way be thought of as having no temporal career, in that if we 
limit our view to the special class of attributes, we shall not be 
able to distinguish different points in its career by any difference 
in it with respect to them. If we broadened our consideration to 
include other attributes, however, we would be able to distinguish 
different points and stages of the career of the energeia.
35 Dilemmas (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 93- 110 , passim.
36 Urmson made this suggestion in conversation; I have revised it somewhat 
in order to adapt it to my present purposes. Notice that the problem of picking 
out the special class of relevant attributes is tantamount to the problem of 
making Aristotle’s distinction. I am not here trying to suggest how this might 
best be done.
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If we accept this suggestion (I do not claim to have proved it), 
we have an initial grasp of a notoriously difficult piece of Aristote­
lian doctrine, the view adopted in the central books of the M eta- 
physics that substance (ovcrLa) is energeia {Met. 1X 5105062-3 ; cf. 
perhaps 104866-9). Aristotle is continuing to hold the view that a 
substance is something which, in relevant and privileged respects, 
does not change and thus, he thinks, has uproblematical identity 
over time. The difference is that at 105062-3 , Aristotle says that 
“substance and form  is energeia,” thus betraying the new idea 
(which appears often in the middle—chronologically late—books 
of the Metaphysics) that the only genuine substances are (Aristo­
telian) Forms.37 These undergo either no temporal change or a 
sort of change which is in Aristotle’s view easily discounted (see the 
last paragraph of Section V), and thus have their identity over 
time fixed in the way which Plato tried to provide for his own 
Forms (cf. Section IV).
Nicholas P. White
The University o f  Michigan
37 See W.D. Ross (ed.), Aristotle’s Metaphysics, corr. ed. (Oxford, 1953), I, 
cxi-cxiv; Owen, “The Platonism of Aristotle,” p. 137 with n. 1 ; and M.J. 
Woods, “Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13 ,” in J.M.E. Moravcsik (ed.), 
Aristotle: A Collection o f Critical Essays (New York, 1967), pp. 2 15 -238.
